A frente escondida

História da resistência organizada na província neerlandesa de Limburg durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Título original: Het Verborgen Front - Geschiedenis van de georganiseerde illegaliteit in de provincie Limburg tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog
1994 por Cammaert, Alfred Paul Marie
Este livro (em neerlandês) no sítio web da Universidade de Groningen

Summary

 

Início

Traduzido com a versão gratuita do tradutor - www.DeepL.com/Translator
Um relato satisfatório da história da resistência organizada na província do Limburgo não será encontrado seguindo exclusivamente os acontecimentos e desenvolvimentos relevantes nos anos da ocupação alemã. Já nos anos dezanove foram lançadas fundações que podem servir de explicação parcial para uma atitude partidária após os acontecimentos de Maio de 1940. No seu estabelecimento, a Igreja Católica desempenhou um papel importante, pois foi esta comunidade eclesiástica que mais do que tudo considerou a ameaça do radicalismo de direita como um assunto a não subestimar, e que foi a primeira a pegar em armas, lançando um contra-ataque social feroz. Talvez isso pareça notável. O sucesso do movimento nacional-socialista (N.S.B.) no principal Limburgo católico, como foi sugerido várias vezes, fez parte da simpatia dos círculos católicos pelo corporativismo relacionado com o fascismo? A resposta é negativa. Embora as tendências radicais de direita tenham assumido a estratégia corporativa de evitar conflitos, defendida pela igreja católica, de uma forma autoritária modificada e assim comprometendo a filosofia original, tiraram partido da crise económica global e do impacto da mesma. Nisto, a N.S.B., certamente considerada inicialmente moderada, teve o melhor sucesso. Quem votou a favor da N.S.B., geralmente não o fez com base numa opinião política, e não com base na insatisfação, medo e protesto contra os partidos da coligação que não pareciam ainda ser capazes de dar uma resposta suficiente sobre a crise em expansão. Nesta matéria, o corporativismo desempenhou um papel negligenciável. Para tirar o vento das velas do radicalismo de direita que ganhou popularidade e para pacificar os eleitores, era importante, antes de mais, combater o pior impacto da crise económica, uma tarefa que repousava principalmente sobre os ombros do governo e das empresas. A igreja católica, por outro lado, com o apoio de muitas organizações sociais católicas, enfatizou a luta do radicalismo de direita, particularmente a N.S.B., que obteve um triunfo eleitoral impressionante em 1935. Liderado pelo Bispo J.H.G. Lemmens de Roermond e por clérigos líderes e socialmente empenhados como H.A. Poels e J. Jacobs, um contra-ataque fundamental desencadeado em meados dos anos noventa, que no Sul da província, onde o N.S.B. (Movimento Nacional Socialista) encontrou o seu maior apoio, foi combatido em punhais desembainhados. Princípios éticos, morais e baseados na fé foram colocados em posição contra os objectivos e a prática do nacional-socialismo. Ao exercer a sua influência e exercer a sua autoridade a todos os níveis sociais, a Igreja Católica conseguiu estigmatizar o N.S.B. e forçá-lo à defensiva. Os apoiantes do partido tinham boas razões para temer pelo seu trabalho, alguns até se viram confrontados com um boicote social.
A contra-ofensiva católica romana intensificou e clarificou o processo social de polarização fortalecido pelo avanço do radicalismo de direita. Um sector "mau" da sociedade foi tornado identificável, o contraste entre o bem e o mal, tão dominante nos anos de guerra, retiraria dele uma parte da sua vitalidade.
Embora o sentimento anti-socialista nacional fosse inegavelmente generalizado no Limburgo, a militância estimulada pela igreja não se revelou imediatamente após a invasão alemã. Levou ainda algum tempo até que houvesse uma resistência de inspiração católica de qualquer estrutura. Isto está relacionado com as tácticas seguidas pelas forças ocupantes, que visavam conquistar suavemente a população para o nacional-socialismo. A Igreja e as suas organizações sociais estavam a funcionar normalmente e os efeitos da guerra e da ocupação permaneciam limitados. No entanto, no Sul da província, três unidades militares-civilistas subterrâneas cresceram no decurso de 1940 e 1941. Baseavam-se num sentimento comum de desconforto em resposta à derrota de Maio de 1940. Dezenas dos seus membros consideravam ser seu dever abalar a população através da edição ou distribuição de jornais ou panfletos através da rede subterrânea ou frustrando o inimigo sempre que possível. Devido a uma combinação fatídica de um esforço de acção sem controlo e falta de experiência, os três núcleos de resistência foram rapidamente apanhados pelo Sicherheitsdienst (polícia de segurança alemã) e pela Abwehr (contra-espionagem alemã). Como resultado da infiltração e da traição, foram arredondados um a um entre o final de 1941 e a queda de 1942. Embora a sua contribuição concreta para a resistência contra as forças ocupantes tenha tido pouco impacto, estas formações iniciais de resistência foram importantes para o desenvolvimento futuro do movimento clandestino. Devido à sua função pioneira e devido à forma como serviram de modelo, estas primeiras unidades subterrâneas tiveram consequências significativas para o desenvolvimento futuro do movimento subterrâneo. Além disso, trouxeram muitas ligações valiosas na província e para além das quais os seus sucessores se podiam apoiar.
A primeira actividade clandestina com o selo da Igreja Católica, ou melhor, do clero católico, envolveu a ajuda aos prisioneiros de guerra francófonos que tinham fugido da Alemanha. Ao contrário dos seus camaradas flamengos, que puderam regressar a casa logo após a capitulação belga, Hitler tinha ordenado que todos os soldados valões tivessem de permanecer internados na Alemanha. O mesmo se aplicava aos soldados franceses. Eram alojados em campos especiais ou edifícios vigiados. Durante o dia tinham de trabalhar em qualquer tipo de trabalho, e muitos estavam empregados na agricultura. Alguns faziam uso da relativa liberdade para escapar. Nos finais de 1940, o primeiro destes fugitivos apareceu na fronteira entre o Limburgo e a Alemanha. O facto de terem aparecido precisamente nesta zona foi o resultado da localização dos campos de prisioneiros de guerra. Muitos prisioneiros de guerra perceberam que o caminho mais curto e seguro de regresso a casa era através do território ocupado, ou seja, através do Limburgo. Aí tinham mais hipóteses de serem ajudados pela população local do que na Alemanha. Bateram em qualquer quinta ou foram a uma igreja, assumindo que o padre local falaria francês e não deixaria um membro da mesma religião à sua sorte. O fenómeno foi encontrado em todo o Norte e Mid-Limburg em particular. Em geral, havia uma vontade considerável de ajudar os soldados esfarrapados e famintos, mas a questão de como organizar esta ajuda era muito mais premente. Tinha de haver muita improvisação. No entanto, durante os anos de 1941 e 1942, foi estabelecida com sucesso uma extensa rede de comunicação. Este sistema era na realidade composto por numerosas redes pequenas e informais. Elas não eram muito organizadas. As principais artérias corriam ao longo da margem ocidental do Meuse em North- and Mid-Limburg: linhas de comunicação entre os pontos de trânsito maiores, como Grubbenvorst, Baarlo e Horn. Os locais regulares onde a fronteira era atravessada situavam-se entre Stramproy e Roosteren, na fronteira belga. Para além de Achterhoek e Twente, os habitantes de outras partes do país quase não se envolveram ou não se envolveram de todo com estes fugitivos francófonos, de modo que o trabalho de socorro continuou a ser um assunto quase exclusivamente do Limburgo.
Embora este sistema fosse vulnerável, a infiltração e a traição eram esporádicas. A população era silenciosa ou ajudada indirectamente. Era uma forma de resistência para a qual, devido ao aspecto humanitário e ao risco comparativamente pequeno para a população local, existia compreensão ou apreciação. Os valões e franceses vindos das províncias holandesas orientais Gelderland e Overijssel repatriaram inicialmente através do Noord-Brabant para a Bélgica e França, mas no decurso de 1942, foram estabelecidas novas ligações. Desde então, viajaram na sua maioria para sul através do Limburgo.
Esta ajuda atingiu um pico em 1943 e continuou até ao Verão de 1944. Centenas de pessoas tornaram-se directamente envolvidas. Eles sabiam que gozavam de um amplo apoio social. No total, ajudaram cerca de dois mil prisioneiros de guerra. Para além destes méritos, a ajuda teve dois importantes efeitos secundários. Em circunstâncias fortuitas, foi mobilizado desde cedo um potencial de resistência, do qual surgiram espontânea e improvisadamente numerosas redes de ligação. Além disso, os ajudantes ganharam uma experiência muito necessária em trabalho ilegal, cujos frutos seriam colhidos não só por eles, mas também por aqueles que mais tarde se juntaram à resistência. *) e membros da tripulação de bombardeiros abatidos, pediram ajuda às várias redes. Para a maioria deles, a ajuda não se podia limitar a fazer passar a fronteira belga. As rotas de fuga existentes praticamente todas terminaram em território belga. As rotas de fuga tiveram de ser consideravelmente alargadas à Suíça e Espanha, ou foi necessário estabelecer novas rotas. Isto foi conseguido por sua própria iniciativa, mas especialmente com a ajuda de pessoas de contacto belgas e organizações de refugiados. A propósito, a ajuda a estes refugiados já não era um assunto exclusivo do Limburgo. Estiveram envolvidas categorias de todas as partes do país. Muitas organizações, grupos e indivíduos voltaram-se para as suas redes de ligação existentes para encaminhar os refugiados ou tentaram criar rotas de fuga separadas com o apoio de habitantes do Limburgo ainda não envolvidos na ajuda.
Porque o fornecimento de refugiados flutuou de acordo com a categoria e foi impossível estabelecer sistemas de linhas separadas para cada tipo de refugiado, a ajuda correu mal durante algum tempo. Tornou as longas linhas, susceptíveis de infiltração e traição, ainda mais vulneráveis. Só no decurso de 1943 se tornou visível uma tendência para a separação e especialização, devido a uma certa profissionalização e ao aparecimento de organizações nacionais com redes alargadas como a LO, o que tornou possível uma melhor coordenação e diversificação da ajuda. Este processo recebeu um impulso extra pela perda de redes mais antigas que, como resultado da infiltração pelo vírus tipo Englandspiel (Jogo inglês), tinham ficado paralisadas. A profissionalização e a diversificação eram ainda mais necessárias porque o ocupante estava interessado em cortar ou controlar as rotas de voo internacionais, que também eram frequentemente utilizadas para a transmissão de informação. Se um piloto ou um aliado England Eye conseguisse alcançar um território desocupado, ele evoluiu, de facto, para um agente secreto. O uso ilegal organizado dos seus serviços poderia fluir através dele para dar informações à Inglaterra. Embora isto raramente tenha ocorrido, é evidente que aqueles que escaparam a tais viagens internacionais para se tornarem um informador valioso tanto para os Aliados como para os Alemães, quanto mais não seja devido ao seu conhecimento das comunicações em rede, bem como de quaisquer condições nos territórios ocupados.
Não se sabe quantos judeus e ingleses chegaram ao território desocupado através do Limburgo e das rotas de fuga belgas. Sabemos pelos pilotos Aliados que pelo menos 345 tentaram fugir para Espanha e Inglaterra via Limburgo. A maioria deles atravessou a fronteira belga perto de Maastricht, onde duas organizações especializadas nessa assistência estavam activas, ou na área entre Stramproy e Roosteren, onde se fazia uso frequente das redes para prisioneiros de guerra francófonos. Apenas 125 a 150 pilotos conseguiram fazer a longa viagem por terra. Quase todos os outros caíram em mãos alemãs. Só no final de 1943, quando as consequências desastrosas e o objectivo do "Jogo inglês" se tornaram gradualmente mais claras, é que as coisas começaram a correr mais suavemente. Foi estabelecido um número crescente de ligações de rádio fiáveis com a Inglaterra e os pilotos tiveram de responder a questionários detalhados antes de poderem obter ajuda. Também, com a invasão Aliada da Normandia em Junho de 1944, já não era necessário enviar pilotos pelo longo caminho de regresso a casa via Gibraltar ou Suíça. Desde então, esperaram pela libertação com civis ou, como no norte de França e nas Ardenas, em campos especiais. “” were gradually being perceived, did things start to run more smoothly. An increasing number of bona fide radiographic communications with England were established and pilots had to answer detailed questionnaires before receiving aid. Also, after the allied invasion in Normandy in June 1944 it was no longer necessary for pilots to be sent on their way home along the extended lines of communication. Since then, they waited for liberation day at private homes or, as was the case in the North of France and the Ardennes, in special encampments.
 

Aid to Jews

Apart from a few exceptions the Catholic Church (in Limburg) and the Limburg clergy played a less prominent part in the aid to Jews. This was probably not so much the result of a slumbering and moderate anti-semitism in Catholic circles as it was the result of a lack of necessary communications outside of the province and with the small Jewish community in Limburg itself. The earliest initiatives to extend a helping hand to the increasingly sorely tried Jews came from the Reformed community within and outside of Limburg. They established the communications which enabled a growing number of Jews to go into hiding in Limburg or by way of this province, to flee to safer places. Gradually an increasing number of Catholics became involved in the aid to Jews. This development received a strong impetus in the summer of 1943, owing to the fact that the provincial agency which specialized in providing places of hiding and which had then only recently been founded, made contact with the national agency (for aid to persons in hiding). Thanks to the ensuing communications many dozens, possibly hundreds of Jews could still be provided with accommodation in places scattered all over the province. What is striking moreover is that most of them found shelter in villages in the Peel and Meuse-valley on the west bank of the Meuse in North- and Mid-Limburg, the eastern mining district and in the region of Maastricht. The number of Jews from outside the province who were hiding in Limburg probably came to more than two thousand. Of the 1660 Limburg Jews approximately 30% succeeded in evading deportation by going into hiding in the neighbourhood, by fleeing to Belgium, where persecution policy was less rigorous, or by making use of an international route of escape. If we add the Jews from other parts of the country who tried to reach unoccupied territory or Belgium by way of Limburg, we arrive at a careful estimate of a general total of two and a half to three and a half thousand Jews aided in or by way of Limburg. Between a hundred and fifty and two hundred of them - between 4,29% and 8% - still fell into German hands.
In no other field of the organized resistance was the driving force and the contribution of the Limburg clergy as evident as in the aid to those in need of a place to hide. The bishop’s attitude of fierce rejection with regard to national socialism did not undergo any change after May 1940 compared to their point of view taken in the nineteenthirties. In the course of 1942 and 1943, owing to the growing German pressure on the Dutch population, the bishop’s protests acquired a more general character. In the first five months of 1943 they reached their hight when students were being heavily pressurized to sign a pledge of loyalty, when whole age categories had to report for hard labour in Germany, and former military servicemen were confronted with the prospect of being taken back into captivity. The latter measure was the immediate cause for the onset of the April-May strike, which showed that the resistance of th Dutch was not broken at all.
 

L.O.

The measures mentioned above and the strike of April-May were the basic grounds for the foundation of the provincial agency for aid to persons in hiding in Limburg. Drs. J.L. Moonen, secretary to the Bishop of Roermond, took the view that the Catholic Church should no longer remain an impassive spectator and limit itself to issuing verbal and written protests. He was not the only one to take this view. Numerous, predominantly younger socially committed clergymen were well aware of the rising distress among the young people. In the spring and the early summer meetings were held in many places in North- and Mid-Limburg in which the question of how to give shape to the possibility of going into hiding was feverishly being deliberated by clergymen and young people who came chiefly from Catholic society life, now combined in the Catholic Movement (“Katholieke Actie”), and from the former Dutch Union (“Nederlandsche Unie”). An additional, but essential advantage was that many of them, through the aid to refugees, meanwhile had at their disposal the vitally essential communications and experience. For that reason a new, extensive relief system could be built up within the space of five months. The swift establishment of the Limburg agency for aid to persons in hiding and the relatively broad social basis for this kind of underground activity confirmed in particular that a Catholic-humanitarian inspired resistance went well together with the mentality of the Limburg population.
The result of a natural combination of activities, particularly in North- and Mid-Limburg, was that the Limburg agency comprised virtually the whole range of Catholic-humanitarian underground activities (aid to POW’s, allied pilots, Jews, passengers to England and - Jewish - persons in hiding). Furthermore, the Limburg agency developed numerous additional activities such as distributing underground newspapers, accumulating and passing on intelligence, repatriating those doing hard labour out of Germany, preparing all sorts of counterfeit documents, getting funds to meet expenses, and establishing and maintaining communications with the camp in Vught and the two prisons in Maastricht.
The Limburg agency was responsible for approximately fourteen thousand persons in hiding, spread out over eleven districts of which a few were located in part or entirely in the provinces of North-Brabant and Gelderland. For a long time there were no catastrophes, but in June 1944 the agency received a sharp blow when nearly all the leading members in Weert were picked up by the Sicherheitsdienst. A month later a large part of the district leadership in Gulpen met with the same fate. Elsewhere too, members were lost as a result of infiltration, betrayal, carelessness or purely by chance, but each time vacant places were soon filled again.
The rather isolated development of the Catholic-humanitarian resistance turned out to have a disadvantage that no one had reckoned with in advance. By consistently ignoring the importance of a line of communication with the London government agencies at home, and thus by neglecting to inform the government about the nature and size of the organized resistance, damage was done unwittingly. In London, it was impossible to form a clear picture of the contribution to the resistance by the Catholic part of the nation. Worse, the picture that unfolded was distorted, because some of the passengers to England, apart from the question whether they did so intentionally or not, declared to know nothing of the resistance in the Catholic South or never to have heard of it. Thus the way was paved for the persistent myth that the Dutch Catholic community had not measured up when it came to resisting the Germans.
 

Commando Groups

Until late in 1943, there were virtually no activities by commando groups. This may be explained by pointing out three reasons. The Limburg agency had so many contacts with civil servants at town halls and food offices that raids to acquire coupons, identity cards, and other documents were not given top priority. Many refugees were hiding out in rural areas, where the quantity of food that remained outside of the coupon system was usually sufficient. Secondly, the Catholic-humanitarian resistance operated at its best under quiet circumstances. Offensive or aggressive underground activities such as raids, liquidations, and sabotage would only attract attention where attention was unwelcome. In this regard, both clergy and lay persons insisted on restraint and control. Nonviolent resistance could lean on the sympathy of the population; it was more in keeping with the Limburg mentality.
Initially Limburg had four commando groups that had evolved spontaneously, respectively in Roermond, Helden, Sittard, and Heerlen, of which the three latter ones were the most important. Together they were comprised of a few dozen members. Their high-handed and incoherent way of taking action came increasingly to be criticized, among others by the secretary to the Bishop of Roermond, J.L. Moonen.
Reorganization and Professionalization implied the necessity to relinquish a part of their independence and this soon turned out to be incompatible with the spirit of the commando groups and to meet with difficulties. Early in 1944 the Sittard commando group even turned its back on the restructuring conferences and the Roermond commando group shifted its field of activity to North-Holland. Only after the arrest of the provincial leadership of the Limburg agency for aid to persons in hiding in June 1944 did the reorganization process gain ground. One coordinating commando group was set up for North-Limburg and another one for South-Limburg, headed by a provincial commando leader.
On orders from the national commando leadership the two Limburg commando groups were transformed in the summer into sabotage groups with the aim to support the allied advance by practising (railway)sabotage. Supported by civilians and members of the Board of Resistance (the “R.V.V.”) they succeeded in the first few weeks in throwing a little disorder into the German transportation system. Soon after that followed the liberation of the South of the province. Because of a shortage of weapons the commando group of North-Limburg proceeded in September to ambush and disarm German soldiers. The commando’s subsequently withdrew with their prisoners of war into the woods in the vicinity of Baarlo and Helde. They were a mixed company: in addition to members of the commando group of North-Limburg the group was comprised of volunteers, members of the Militia (“Ordedienst” or “O.D.”, responsible for maintaining public order) and members of the commando groups from Schijndel and the country between Meuse and Waal, who had joined the ones in Limburg in September. After the allied advance had come to a standstill the group soon got into difficulties, but the problems were faced up to with success. On November the 19th 1944 British troups arrived at the encampment in the woods. Immediately after the liberation commando’s who wished to were admitted into the newly established Regiment Stoottroepen Prins Bernhard ("storm troops"), a division of the Domestic Forces in the Netherlands. In March 1945 they crossed the Rhine with the American 9th batallion to continue the fighting on German territory. In the late spring of 1945 most of them returned home.
 

Underground press

Of a total of approximately one thousand three hundred underground newspapers that appeared during the occupation years, only thirty and forty were of Limburg origin. Most of the Limburg underground newspapers - their combined circulation did not exceed 20,000 issues - appeared in the first years of the occupation and in its final stages. In the last half year of the occupation the allied advance, the quick succession of events, and the approaching front required up-to-the-minute reports.
Like the Catholic-humanitarian resistance, which was based on unity and harmony, the Limburg, as opposed to the national underground press, was apolitical in character. The reason why in spite of this only a few regional or local papers were published may probably be accounted for by the booming development of the national underground press in 1942 and 1943. The underground paper was a scarce and cherished product; its religious or political persuasion apparantly was not what really mattered. However, some of the representatives of the resistance were concerned for a political manipulation of the reading public. Their concern turned out to be unfounded in practice. War and occupation did not bring about any remarkable swing in the field of political forces; in Limburg at least there was no sign of it.
 

O.D.

The Limburg Militia (“O.D.”) was a reflection of the national Militia, the gist of which is that the organization was getting prepared to maintain peace and order during and particularly after the retreat of the occupying forces. In spite of all the preparations the Militia, developed as it was along military lines, was granted only a modest part to play in the period of liberation. For many of its members, this resulted in great disappointment. Because the liberation of Limburg was initiated as early as in September 1944 there was no time left to preserve the Militia from an inglorious downfall. In the district of Maastricht, which was the first to be liberated, the actions taken by the organization ended in failure. Several competing groups, who all set themselves up as the only representatives of the national organization, disputed each other’s authority while the maintainance of peace and order in fact devolved upon the Military Rule imposed by the Dutch government. In the months following the liberation many Militiamen found a place with the Guards of the Domestic Forces, who, on account of their less romantic duties and their poor equipment, were looked upon as a stepbrother of the Storm troops who were provided with equipment by the Americans.
 

Other underground movements

National underground movements whose aims were at odds with the (apolitical) nature and methods of the Catholic-humanitarian resistance, were predestined to play a marginal part. This was also true for organizations that failed to make contact with existing groups or networks. Both the Board of Resistance, the communists, and some of the intelligence services encountered this drawback. The Board of Resistance, a national organization imported into South-Limburg early in 1944 with a rigid, central management and an offensive, aggressive objective, did not fit in very well with the Catholic-humanitarian resistance, but succeeded nevertheless in recruiting a relatively large number of Militiamen who wanted to do more than just wait for liberation day. The cooperation with the commando group from Heerlen/South-Limburg did not proceed very smoothly in spite of the fact that some operations were planned and carried out jointly. The Board of Resistance was criticized repeatedly. Thus it was thrown into the organization’s teeth that it was taking foolhardy action and that it left unused sabotage equipment dropped by the allies.
Even before the war the Limburg communists found themselves in a position of social isolation, but during the occupation years they seemed to be a little more popular. Communists active in the underground party structure aimed for cooperation with any underground group willing to do the same. Apart from the fact that this cooperation hardly came off the ground, the Limburg communists did have a different attitude, or rather, they anticipated on the national party line. What the politically-ideologically inspired underground struggle concentrated on, in addition to sabotage and aid to persons in hiding, was publishing and distributing papers and pamphlets through the underground networks. Particularly in the mining district, where they had their best representation in numbers, the communists gained prestige by their stubborn, tenacious resistance, their high human sacrifice, and their plea for a future united trade union. However, it did not come to a permanent breakthrough in their isolation.
 

Intelligence Services

Support by and contact with existing underground networks or groups was indispensible for the intelligence services. Organizations that did not acknowledge this fact or acknowledged it insufficiently, like the Secret Service in the Netherlands and the “Pietab-OXO” group, were to play a minor part, while for example the “Albrecht”-group, which in North- and Mid-Limburg had joined forces with the local resistance, operated with remarkable efficiency. Good results were also achieved by intelligence services that had evolved out of existing underground organizations. The intelligence services of both the Militia and the Limburg agency for aid to persons in hiding supplied the resistance and the allies with valuable information.
 

Resumee

How should the resistance in Limburg, and its Catholic-humanitarian main constituent, be regarded when viewed from a national perspective? Notwithstanding the largely independent development that Limburg presented, many relief organizations in the country were for the transfer of their refugees dependent on the networks in Limburg, which had been set up proceeding from this province or were linked to others in Belgium, France, and even Germany, and ended in Switzerland or Spain. Refugees making their way individually, passengers to England, various intelligence services, and other national underground organizations also made use of them. The province not only served as a transit area for refugees, refugees could also be served here. Limburg offered space and there were several relief agencies that made use of this space with increasing frequency. Religion was not a decisive factor in all this. The significance and impact of Limburg on a national level was, in other words, particularly evident in the field in which the provincial development was most advanced, e.g. nonviolent humanitarian resistance and corresponding methods and communications.
This is what constitutes both the intrinsic force and the specific value of the resistance in Limburg.

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&upArr;) Na Holanda, Engelandvaarder é o nome de honra para todos os homens e mulheres que conseguiram escapar do território ocupado durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1945), após a capitulação das forças armadas holandesas em 15 de Maio de 1940 e antes da invasão Aliada da Normandia em 6 de Junho de 1944 (Dia D), com a intenção de se juntarem às forças Aliadas em Inglaterra ou outro território Aliado para participarem activamente na luta contra o inimigo (Alemanha, Itália, Japão).

 

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Click on the following links for the chapters of this (Dutch) book at the web site of the University of Groningen:

Summary	english
Hoofdstuk 0	Title pages and table of contents, 190 KB
Hoofdstuk 1	Opkomst en bestrijding van fascistische en nationaal-socialistische stromingen in de jaren dertig, 190 KB
Hoofdstuk 2	De eerste militair-civiele verzetsformaties, 177 KB
Hoofdstuk 3	Hulpverlening aan uit Duitsland ontvluchte (Franstalige) krijgsgevangenen, 353 KB
Hoofdstuk 4	Hulpverlening aan geallieerde piloten en hun bemanningsleden, 479 KB
Hoofdstuk 5	Hulpverlening aan joden, 339 KB
Hoofdstuk 6a	De Landelijke Organisatie voor hulp aan onderduikers, deel 1, 442 KB
Hoofdstuk 6b	De Landelijke Organisatie voor hulp aan onderduikers, deel 2, 1 MB
Hoofdstuk 7	De knokploegen en de geschiedenis van de stoottroepen tot de zomer van 1945, 519 KB
Hoofdstuk 8	De Ordedienst, 953 KB
Hoofdstuk 9	De Raad van Verzet in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 135 KB
Hoofdstuk 10	De C.P.N. en de illegaliteit, 465 KB
Hoofdstuk 11	Illegale pers, 583 KB
Hoofdstuk 12	Inlichtingen, 332 KB